Guest Opinion

Oct 31, 2002

Kenai incident reminds of need to address response gap

By John Devens, PhD
Executive Director
Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council

In early October, the Prince William Sound escort system proved itself again. When the tanker Kenai experienced engine problems at Hinchinbrook Entrance and called for assistance, Alyeska tugs promptly hooked up and conducted the ship to a safe anchorage for repairs.

The captain of the Kenai made the right call, and Alyeska took the right measures.

But this successful outcome was somewhat a matter of luck: the weather was mild, with 14-mph winds and 2-foot waves. In weather that developed a few hours later, the outcome might have been different.

The fact is, our escort and response system suffers from a dangerous gap in capability. Tankers legally sail from Valdez in weather so severe that it would be impossible to contain or clean up spilled oil. And there is some doubt that the kind of aid the Kenai received would be possible in bad weather.

What kind of weather?

For spill response, the answer is clear. Loaded tankers can sail if the wind at Hinchinbrook is less than 45 knots (about 52 mph) and the wave height is less than 15 feet.

The industry's oil spill contingency plans, however, specify that cleanup is possible only in winds under 30 knots (about 35 mph) and waves of less than 10 feet.

When the weather is between those two limits, a loaded tanker can sail but no cleanup response is possible if it spills oil.

Weather at Hinchinbrook is estimated to be in this response gap about 7 percent of the time, equivalent to 26 days out of 365. In other words, for nearly four weeks a year, no immediate cleanup effort would be possible in the event of a spill.

As for tanker rescues, the situation is cloudier but still alarming. As discussed above, loaded tankers can sail if the wind at Hinchinbrook is under 45 knots and waves are under 15 feet.

But could Alyeska rescue a disabled tanker in such conditions? Computer simulations indicate the answer is yes, but Alyeska and the tanker companies have declined, because of safety concerns, to practice tanker rescues in weather anywhere nearly as severe. And they have never said exactly what conditions they do consider safe for such drills.

No one wants tug or tanker crews to drill in unsafe conditions. But common sense suggests you can't be certain of doing what you don't practice.

In the case of the Kenai, mild weather didn't last long. Within about 15 hours, conditions passed the 30/10 threshold and were in the response gap. Six hours later, weather passed the 45/15 limit at which Hinchinbrook Entrance is closed to tanker travel. If the Kenai's departure had been delayed by 18 hours, it is questionable whether the save attempt would have been successful, and it is fairly clear that no immediate cleanup response would have been possible had the tanker spilled oil.

This is unacceptable. Oil shouldn't cross the Sound on those 26 days a year when weather would preclude oil-spill cleanup and possibly even the tanker save that could forestall another Valdez-scale disaster.

Perhaps the tanker closure limits need to be reduced.

Or perhaps, with better technology and training, both tanker saves and cleanup response could be made safe and feasible in worse weather than is now the case.

Or perhaps the traffic rules could be tightened, as follows: "If you're under way when the weather enters the response gap you may continue. But if you're still at the dock, delay your departure until the weather subsides."

But action is clearly needed. We can't call our system the safest possible when it suffers from a gap this large.

Accordingly, we have begun exploring what to do about the situation. Cooperative efforts by citizens, government and industry have resolved numerous safety issues in the Sound – from escort system improvements to ice-detection radar to tanker vapor controls – and we are confident the same kind of cooperation will be able to close this dangerous response gap.

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John Devens is executive director of the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council. He was mayor of Valdez at the time of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.

The council is an independent non-profit corporation that promotes environmentally safe operation of the Valdez Marine Terminal and associated tankers. Its work is guided by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and its contract with Alyeska Pipeline Service Company. RCAC's 18 member organizations are communities in the region affected by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, as well as commercial fishing, aquaculture, Native, recreation, tourism and environmental groups.