The Observer, September 2005

return to this edition

From the Executive Director: Industry tug study raises questions – and concerns

by John Devens

I’ve written before in this space about the oil industry’s desire to cut oil tanker escort requirements from two tugs to one in Prince William Sound. This would be the first major reduction in safety measures since the Exxon Valdez spill of 1989 and the council is adamantly opposed unless it can be shown with rigorous science that no increase in risk would result.

But the industry is also working from another direction to reduce the tug system. It is conducting a closely held study of whether the tug fleet can be cut from ten vessels to eight without a change in escort requirements. That is, double escorts would continue, at least in the short term, but only eight tugs would be used to perform the service (as well as more mundane chores like berthing tankers and moving oil-spill response barges).

The industry has not specified exactly what tugs it is considering taking out of the system. But among those put on “unassigned” status for this study was the Sea Voyager, one of the few vessels in the fleet capable of assisting tankers in the challenging conditions found at Cape Hinchinbrook and of operating in the open seas of the Gulf of Alaska.

Thus, the industry appears to be considering truly significant changes, and any such reduction is potentially problematic. Fewer tugs would mean less reserve capacity in the system, resulting in more stress on crews and equipment. And the bigger and stronger the tugs taken out of service, the more severe these stresses would be.

All of this would be alarming enough if the tug-reduction study were being conducted properly.

But it’s not. It’s being done in the summer, when the weather is at its best, daylight is at its longest, and tanker traffic through the Sound is at its lowest (because North Slope oil production drops in summer). In addition, one of the two tanker-loading berths at Alyeska’s Valdez terminal has been out of service for maintenance this summer, further simplifying operations during the study. Yet the industry has so far not committed to continue collecting data through the coming winter, when the system will be operating at maximum capacity and under maximum stress.

Another shortcoming is that the study focuses almost exclusively on the role of tugs in preventing oil spills, devoting only minimal attention to their equally important part in oil-spill response.

Moreover, the industry is keeping too many crucial aspects of the study to itself. The people in charge have declined to give us access to the database where study information is being compiled, or to provide a working version of a computer spreadsheet used to estimate transport times for response barges with a reduced tug fleet. The conduct of this study represents one of the most disturbing failures of transparency that we have seen in our many years of overseeing oil-transportation operations in Prince William Sound.

It reminds me of the days leading up to March 24, 1989, when I was mayor of Valdez: citizen concerns were ignored and we were told not to worry because the industry would take care of everything. I thought North America’s worst oil spill had ended that kind of complacency forever, but I’m afraid it’s making a comeback today.

The secrecy shrouding this study is doubly alarming for what it may portend with regard to the other component of the industry campaign to pare down the tug system. I refer to the effort, mentioned at the beginning of this article, to cut tanker escort requirements from two tugs to one.

Industry officials have proposed that this idea also be the subject of a technical study – called a risk assessment – and have promised that citizens would be fully involved. It’s hard to take that pledge seriously when they are conducting a largely closed study under our very noses.

We don’t for a moment believe this approach reflects the values of the many fine and safety-minded mariners we work with every day in Prince William Sound. We doubt that many of them, if able to speak freely, would support either of these efforts.

I fear that what’s going on here is not solid science, but a hard-nosed drive to justify a decision already made for financial reasons in distant oil-company headquarters.

Even more amazing is the fact that these reductions are being proposed at a time of record high oil prices. If prices were low, these proposals would be alarming enough, if not altogether surprising. With oil over $60 a barrel, they are simply incomprehensible.

If the industry succeeds in these reduction efforts, we could very well end up with no reserve capacity in the system. If a single tug breaks down, or a spell of bad weather causes a tanker traffic jam, regulators will be faced with an excruciating choice: either waive the safety rules or pinch off the nation’s oil supply at a time when it’s already compromised by the damage hurricane Katrina did to production facilities in the Gulf of Mexico.

It’s not hard to figure how that will play out: The industry will get its waivers and the level of risk will go up.

And the deeper the cuts to the tug system, the more often this will happen. We could very well end up running on waivers most of the time, resulting in a system that no responsible person could call safe.

If this study is to have any credibility, the industry must agree to continue it through the winter months, add a thorough analysis of impacts on oil-spill response capability, and open the process up to citizen involvement.

Otherwise, we’ll do everything in our power to make sure regulators never accept such a flawed study as justification for cutting back the tug system so important to the safety of Prince William Sound.

• John Devens is executive director of the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council.