The Observer, May 2006

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From the Executive Director
BP spill proves rust and complacency never sleep

BP’s recent series of spills and leaks at Prudhoe Bay should throw a good scare into anyone concerned about the integrity of the pipelines that carry millions of barrels of toxic crude oil across our state.

As the Observer went to press, three BP pipeline ruptures had been reported since the beginning of March.

The first, reported to have spilled more than 200,000 gallons of crude oil, was the most serious of the three. It came to light in early March when a worker smelled oil while driving past the site. Like the other incidents, it is still under investigation by BP and its government regulators. Nevertheless, some worrisome facts and troubling questions have already emerged about how one of the world’s biggest oil companies has been conducting itself on the North Slope:

• The spill was caused by corrosion in a 34-inch oil transit line and the site of the leak was not the only trouble spot. Other locations tested after the spill showed significant thinning due to corrosion. In one spot, the pipe wall was only 0.04” thick, thinner than a dime. Corrosion is a well-known problem in the oil business, raising the question of how BP and its regulators could have let it go so far in the case of this 30-year-old line.

• It appears BP may have used an emulsion breaker – a chemical to separate oil and water – that actually accelerated corrosion in the line, another mystifying lapse.

• One important measure for preventing pipeline corrosion is ‘smart-pigging,’ which involves sending a heavily instrumented torpedo-shaped device through the line to check its condition. The line that leaked hadn’t been smart-pigged since 1998, although BP’s own maintenance and management plan filed with the Alaska Department of Environmental Protection suggested smart-pigging would occur every five years. The long delay in pigging the line that failed has not been explained.

• Another technique for checking pipe condition is the use of ultrasound, which is conducted from outside the pipe and provides a picture of the inside. Some 139 locations on the pipe had been inspected ultrasonically in recent years, according to BP. The caribou crossing where the spill occurred was not among them, also still unexplained as the Observer went to press.

All of this seems to point up an important lesson: Rust never sleeps, and neither does complacency. Though the matter is still under investigation, what’s known so far certainly suggests BP and its regulators were lax in monitoring the condition of this pipeline.

As a result, BP may face serious repercussions, including a criminal investigation by the federal Environmental Protection Agency, an inquiry by members of Congress, a state fine of as much as $2.1 million, and increased regulation of lines of the type involved in the leak.

In addition, federal officials have asked if the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System to Valdez could be at risk from the same problems that caused the North Slope leak.

And that, to an extent, is where we come in. We don’t oversee operations on the North Slope or along the 800 miles of the trans-Alaska pipeline, but we do pay close attention to every facet of operations at Alyeska Pipeline’s tanker terminal in Valdez, which has its own system of pipes for moving oil.

As best we can determine, corrosion control is being handled pretty well there. In 2004, we hired our own expert consultant to review the situation at the terminal. His conclusion was that Alyeska was doing a good job of monitoring and responding to corrosion at the facility.

Even in Valdez, however, the council has concerns. Alyeska recently proposed doubling the time between inspections – from 10 years to 20 – of the 14 giant tanks that store oil arriving at the terminal until it can be loaded on tankers. These tanks are 30 years old, and the council doesn’t believe relaxing inspection requirements makes sense. We have opposed the proposal before the state Department of Environmental Conservation.

Which points to what we see as another lesson of the North Slope spill: Citizen oversight is a valuable and powerful tool for making sure that the oil industry and its regulators are careful about everything they do.
Our group is purely advisory, with no power to promulgate a regulation, issue a compliance order, write up a notice of violation, or impose a fine.

But we can do two things.

One is to conduct our own independent reviews of technical issues attendant on operation of the oil terminal in Valdez and the tankers that use it. Our corrosion study at the Valdez terminal is an example.

The other thing we can do is to speak out when we find something worrisome going on, as we just did in Valdez over the tank-inspection issue, and have done on many other issues over the years.

While we would never claim all the credit, it is a fact that strings of mishaps like the BP leaks and spills at Prudhoe are virtually unheard-of at the Alyeska terminal we oversee. Certainly, the terminal has never seen a pipeline spill approaching BP’s 200,000-gallon leak on the North Slope. We can’t help believing that no BP pipeline would ever have been allowed to rust through and spill so much oil if a vigorous citizens’ council had been looking over the company’s shoulder at Prudhoe Bay.

• John Devens is executive director of the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council.